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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-398  
9 NOV 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:   
Acting Director, Policy Guidance Office  
Resource Management Staff

FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Chairman

SUBJECT: Input to the DCI's Annual Report

REFERENCE: Your memo to me dtd 16 October 1978,  
DCI/ICS 78-1193

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Attached, in response to referenced memorandum, are overview comments on "leaks" and "other security measures" for inclusion in the DCI's Annual Report. The comprehensive catalogue of unauthorized disclosures requested by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence will be submitted in early January 1979 and will cover all such disclosures reported to us as occurring in calendar year 1978.

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Robert W. Gambino

Attachment

MORI/CDF

Regraded to OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
When Separated From Attachment

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**SECRET**Leaks

25X1 [ ] Leaks (i.e., unauthorized public disclosures) of sensitive information continue to be a significant problem. During the first ten months of 1978, some 18 cases were reported of classified intelligence information appearing in the press. While most leaks are anonymous as to source, some result from former officials turned author. The cumulative effect weakens our security:

- Intelligence sources hesitate to confide in us or may be lost.
- Target country counterintelligence is spurred on and guided.

25X1 [ ] Analysis of leaks suggests that they primarily occur in the Washington area by persons with access to information which is topical and of high press and public interest. A desire to gain public support for a particular view (e.g., pro/con SALT) is an obvious motivation in many cases. Ex-officials writing a book may hope for pecuniary gain. Only rarely does malice seem to be a factor (e.g., Philip Agee). Individuals who leak intelligence do not seem to have considered or to be troubled by the prospect that their acts can damage the US intelligence effort.

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☐ Identification of leakers is very difficult:

- The press protects its sources as zealously as we do.
- Wide dissemination of many reports makes identification of the leaker a difficult task.

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☐ A serious obstacle to timely investigation of leaks is the difference in objectives between the Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice. We want to identify the source quickly so we can shut off or limit access. Justice sees the issue in prosecutive terms. Unfortunately the present Espionage Statutes confront us with a dilemma - prosecution requires disclosure in open court of the very information we seek to protect. Coming to grips with that dilemma, compiling the data Justice requires before they will authorize an investigation - and only the FBI is authorized to do so outside the confines of our own Agencies - takes quite a bit of time, and may result in the "trail" becoming so cold that a successful outcome is doubtful. An example:

- Portions of a classified intelligence publication were reproduced in a European paper in April 1978.

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- Timely investigation was requested.  
Before the investigation was initiated, Justice Department levied requirements to review leaked material in detail for impact on national security and for a decision on whether it could be declassified for use as evidence in prosecution.
- By late October 1978, with investigation still in its early stages, another leak of almost identical character occurred.

25X1 ☐ Pending the availability of more encompassing criminal laws bearing on leaks, remedies are complicated by several factors. The threat of administrative sanctions may not deter those whose emotional involvement in an issue tempts them to rationalize violations of security rules. The acclaim accorded the successful investigative journalist may tempt some to pursue sensitive subjects more as an adversary than as a citizen concerned with the national security. Competing demands for scarce investigative resources are an inescapable factor in deciding which leaks shall be dealt with. A favorable sign is the District Court ruling in the Snepp case. That shows that secrecy agreements can be enforced, thus offering hope of relief from the knowledgeable author problem.

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☐ Measures within our control which can help remedy the problem of leaks (and minimize resulting damage) include:

- Deletion or sanitization of sensitive source and method data from finished reports.
- Better classification management to enhance the credibility of our security classification programs.
- Requiring secrecy agreements as a condition of access to sensitive intelligence.
- Imposition of more thorough document accountability and handling procedures.
- Expanded and frequent security education and indoctrination programs.

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☐ I am pursuing these objectives in the belief that they will help alleviate the problems caused by leaks. Thorough implementation throughout the Intelligence Community will support my goal of effective and mutually reinforcing security programs.

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**SECRET**Other Security Measuresa. ☐ Industrial Security

The Boyce-Lee espionage case in 1977 prompted a thorough review of our industrial security policies and procedures. Changes made or in progress include:

- Preparation of a uniform security guide for use by contractors and CIA personnel.
- Assignment of additional security officers to work with contractors to provide ongoing assistance and guidance.
- Establishment of security audit procedures for all contractors with classified work.
- Exploration with the Congress on possible legislation empowering the DCI to impose sanctions on contractors who fail to conform to security requirements.

Experience shows that CIA contractors are cooperating to improve security. However, it also shows that they need the continuing guidance the measures above should provide.

I also directed that the polygraph be used wherever feasible. Polygraph examinations are given to those with access

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25X1 to significant levels of highly classified information (e.g., communications and document control personnel) on a voluntary basis. [ ] polygraph examinations at 25 contractor facilities over a 12 month period resulted in discontinued access to sensitive materials for about 2 per cent of those examined, with another 8 per cent being retained with warnings against further involvement in matters of minor derogatory character.

25X1 b. [ ] Document Inspection Program

In the fall of 1978, I instituted regular inspections of all briefcases, packages and other containers being taken out of CIA buildings to guard against unauthorized removal of classified documents. The object was to improve security awareness and discipline. The system has proven to be effective in stopping the casual removal of documents, thereby helping to guard against their inadvertent loss and against temptation to misuse documents once they are in private hands.

25X1 c. [ ] CIA Security Procedures

As a result of the Kampiles incident, I directed a thorough examination and analysis of security procedures in CIA.

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This ongoing zero-base review will determine how existing procedures are being applied, whether they are mutually supportive, and whether they do, in fact, contribute meaningfully to an effective and balanced security program.

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e.  Community Security Support

In the interests of enhancing the capabilities and Community character of my Security Committee, I approved its reorganization and an accompanying increase in staff. Two senior security officers from the Community have been detailed to assist the Security Committee's staff in management and policy development.

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